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Abstract—The rapid development of the embedded systems 
and the wide use of them in many sensitive fields require 
safeguarding their communications. Internet Protocol Security 
(IPsec) is widely used to solve network security problems by 
providing confidentiality and integrity for the communications 
in the network, but it introduces communication overhead. 
This overhead becomes a critical factor with embedded 
systems because of their low computing power and limited 
resources. In this research, we studied the overhead of using 
embedded IPsec in constrained resource systems, which run 
microkernel operating system (OS), in terms of the network 
latency and throughput. To conduct our experiment first, we 
ran the test with an unmodified network stack, and then we 
ran the same test with the modified network stack which 
contains the IPsec implementation. Later, we compared the 
results obtained from these two sets of experiments to examine 
the overhead. Our research demonstrated that the overhead 
imposed by IPsec protocols is small and well within the 
capabilities of even low cost microcontrollers such as the one 
used in the Raspberry Pi computer. 
  
Keywords—Embedded IPsec; LwIP; network security; 
Microkernel.  
I. MOTIVATION 
 All the electronic devices around us such as cellphones, 
washing machines, cars, and aircraft rely on smaller systems 
called embedded systems. The use of embedded system 
produces many security issues. We will discuss some of 
these security issues later in this paper. These issues led us to 
focus on the security threats related to embedded systems.  
The use of microkernel OS can improve security in 
embedded systems [11]. The microkernel OS has many 
advantages such as: small kernel size which reduces the code 
that must be privileged, different access control privileges 
for each applications, and the ability to apply system policy 
to control applications’ communications. The Genode 
framework [18] is a good example of microkernel OS which 
can run on embedded systems. 
 However, using a secure microkernel OS may solve 
some of the security problems of distributed systems, but it 
will not eliminate all of them.  Most embedded systems rely 
on a network to communicate with each other.  The use of 
wired and wireless connections in the embedded systems 
opens the possibility of many security vulnerabilities, for 
example, the security issues in internal network in aircraft. 
This network system contains three different functional 
networks: crew, passenger, and plane control networks. 
These networks separated by virtual LAN [24].   Many 
research have proved that the internal network is prone to 
security attack; passenger could use the on-board 
entertainment network to hack the control system of the 
aircraft [4]. 
 The same issue appears in the internal network of 
vehicles. Most cars use the Controller Area Network (CAN) 
bus in their network communications for in-car network. 
Experimental security analysis of modern cars [21] showed 
that CAN protocol is vulnerable to denial of service attack 
and many more security issues. Since CAN packets are 
broadcasted to all nodes, any malicious component can 
observe, change, and send packets to any node [21], [3]. 
Some security experts used a security tool (CARSHARK) 
connected to CAN bus via OBD-II port to snoop on the car’s 
communications. This attack was able to cause losing the 
control of the car by disabling the brakes or even by stopping 
the engine [21]. 
The security issues are not only related to wired 
communications; wireless communications also have 
inherent problems which may be used by the attackers to 
damage the systems. For example, there is a wireless 
pressure sensor in a car’s tires, which measures the pressure 
and sends the measurement to the pressure central unit. An 
alert is sent to the car’s central unit in case of low pressure.  
A hacker could, in some circumstances, interfere with the 
communications by sending false low-pressure reading or 
even stop the relevant ECU completely [12]. 
Another concern for the car security is to protect the 
driver and the vehicle information privacy and prevent 
unauthorized third parties from tracing and collecting the This research has been sponsored by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, under project “Controlling Concurrent Change.” 
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relevant information depends on vulnerabilities posed by 
wireless technologies which were used in the car [23].  In the 
previous example, an adjacent vehicle in the range of the 
wireless network able to receive the communication between 
the tire pressure sensor and the car’s control unit, these 
communications may contain the ID of the sensor which can 
be used to trace the car and its location. Encrypting the 
messages is one solution to provide the required privacy [1] 
and reduce the ability to collect the car’s identity 
information.  
The previous examples indicate the importance of 
providing privacy, integrity, and origin data in the system 
communications. One solution to provide all these 
requirements is using IPsec. IPsec provides the integrity and 
the confidentiality for each packet in the communication 
session; moreover, IPsec runs in the third layer, which makes 
it transparent to upper layers, therefor applications do not 
need to have any knowledge of IPsec to be able to use it.   
IPsec based on two encapsulation protocols; one is 
Authentication Header (AH) which provides data-origin 
authentication, data-integrity, and protection from the replay-
attack. The other one is Encapsulating Security Payload 
(ESP) which provides data confidentiality and also supports 
its own authentication scheme like that used in AH. IPsec 
can be used in either transport or tunnel mode. Transport 
mode is used to protect the data flows between a pair of 
hosts, while tunnel mode is used to protect the data flows 
between a pair of hosts, two gateways, or between a host and 
a getaway.  IPsec provides security but in the same time, it 
affects the performance of communication because of the 
additional processing required. In embedded applications in 
particular, the main concern is that IPsec may cause 
unacceptable overhead.  
In this paper, we measured the overhead and the 
performance of using IPsec in environment which contains 
embedded devices; these embedded devices run microkernel 
OSs. We compared our results with the case of running the 
test case without IPsec.  We evaluated the measurements in 
the term of CPU utilization and communication delay. 
Finally, we examined the feasibility of applying IPsec in low 
price and limited resources embedded devices, which can be 
used in the future for in-vehicle network architecture.    
The rest of the paper organized as follow. Section II 
describes the related work in measuring the performance of 
IPsec. Section III briefly details the prototype of the system. 
Section IV explains our implementation of the embedded 
IPsec. Section V discusses the test bed configurations. 
Section VI discusses the experimental results. Finally, 
Section VII contains some concluding remarks. 
II. RELATED WORK  
IPsec has been the subject of a lot of research with the 
object of building fast and secure systems. Many groups 
studied the performance of IPsec regarding different factors 
such as the network topology, the network protocols, and the 
OS of the platform in the test beds. Many researchers have 
studied the performance of IPsec under different OSs.  
Niedermayer et al. [16] studied the performance of IPsec 
under various kernel versions of Linux OS, they also 
measured the latency and the throughput when different 
encryption algorithms were used for ESP and different 
authentication algorithms were used for AH. They indicated 
that the use of the fast encryption algorithms will improve 
the performance of ESP. Miltchev et al. [31] studied the 
performance of IPsec under OpenBSD OS, they explored 
how various modes and various encryption algorithms affect 
its performance,  they indicated  that small packet sizes 
causes bad throughput. Narayan et al. [9] studied the 
performance of IPsec on Windows OS combinations, they 
measured the throughput of different versions of Windows 
OS (vista, XP, Windows7) when different IPsec algorithms 
were used (AES, DES, 3DES), their research showed that the 
performance of IPsec under different versions of Windows 
OS was comparable. In monolithic OSs the IPsec 
implementation is part of the kernel, it is interlacing with the 
other components of the kernel. The existence of IPsec in the 
kernel makes the trusted code base huge, it makes the IPsec 
also vulnerable to compromise if other components of the 
kernel were successfully penetrated. Härtig et al. [20] 
provided an approach to reduce the complexity of the trusted 
computing base of a VPN gateway while running it in the top 
of fiasco microkernel OS; they extracted the security relevant 
functions of IPsec and executed them in separate protection 
domain and let the untrusted components, which include the 
TCP/IP implementation, to interact with it. However, they 
did not provide any performance measurement on their 
implementation.  
IPsec was also used to protect the communication in the 
networks which contain resource-constrained devices like 
sensors. Granjal et al. [25] studied the feasibility of using 
IPsec in context of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). In 
their study, they analyzed the execution times and memory 
requirements of cryptographic algorithms; they indicated that 
AES is the best choice for an encryption algorithm to be used 
within IPsec for the embedded devices. Raza et al. [19] 
evaluated the performance of IPsec implementation in WSN 
between the constrained resources sensors and a host 
computer, they studied the performance in terms of packet 
overhead and communication performance, they indicated 
that AH and ESP had similar response times for small 
packets. However, the response time for ESP increases as the 
packet size increases, they also indicated that using AES will 
improve processing time and reduce energy consumption 
comparing to the other encryption algorithms.  
Comparing the IPsec performance overhead over IPv4 
and IPv6 networks was the subject of [8]. They studied the 
performance of IPsec in terms of end to end throughput and 
delay parameters. The authors used Netperf as measurement 
tools and ran their experiment on ordinary PC, which was 
running OpenBSD as OS with 128 MB memory. They 
compared the result of using AH only, ESP only, AH and 
ESP, and without IPsec. The research indicated that the end 
to end throughput degrades to about 1/2 with the AH, while 
it degrades to about 1/4 with the ESP. 
The overhead of IPsec on real-time interactive 
communications was presented in [5] and [10]. Both of the 
papers studied the influence of IPsec when it was used to 
protect voice or video transaction using a wireless link. They 
used IPsec in the tunnel mode with ESP. Zarrella et al.[2] 
showed how the added headers to each packet while 
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applying IPsec cause an overhead on the communications. 
This overhead become significant especially for small VOIP 
packet; it can cause a considerable reduction in throughput 
over a low bandwidth wireless network.  However, the 
results from [5] and [10] indicated that depending on an 
infrastructure, which has adequate bandwidth, the IPsec can 
be used to provide the security for VoIP with negligible 
difference in the quality of transmitted voice and video and 
with minimal decrease in the network performance.   
In general, a lot of research studied the performance and 
the overhead of IPsec on powerful PCs running monolithic 
operating systems, where the IPsec is part of the kernel. On 
the other hand, fewer efforts have been done in studying the 
performance of IPsec when it was used in microkernel 
operating system, or when IPsec was used to protect the 
communication of resource constrained embedded devices. 
Thus, we established our test case by selecting embedded 
IPsec package and integrating it with lightweight IP stack, 
and then we used this modified package as a network stack 
in microkernel operating systems. We measured the 
overhead of using IPsec in this environment comparing to 
using native IP stack. The components of our system are 
discussed in details in Section III. 
III. PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
   This research is one effort in big project called 
Controlling Concurrent Change (CCC) [17]. The main goal 
of CCC project is to provide suitable methods and platform 
architectures for future car. This platform will enable the 
integration of updates and new functions in the field ensuring 
the quality, high robustness, security, and with no significant 
increase in cost or energy consumption. Security is one of 
the cornerstones to achieve the project’s goals by providing 
the security for the upgrading and integration process. The 
first consideration is providing security for the 
communications of the architectural components through the 
local, closed inner-network or through open networks. 
We simulated the ECUs inside the car by using very low 
cost platforms and then provide the security for their 
communications. We used Raspberry Pi [13] as a simulator 
of vehicle’s ECU. Raspberry Pi has many attractive 
properties such as: it is a small size computer board 
composed of an ARM-like SoC, it includes all the I/O and 
storage interfaces, slot for a SD-card, Ethernet port and 
HMDI output. On the other hand, it has the ability to run 
microkernel OS like Genode. Moreover, we can get it at a 
low price approximately for tens of euros. 
We used Genode framework as a runtime environment 
for many reasons; Genode supports various micro kernels 
such as Fiasco and Mini Linux, also it can run directly on the 
ARM hardware depend on a kernel called base-hw kernel, 
which provides the mechanism required by Genode. Genode 
consists of three layers: (1) the microkernel in the kernel 
space, (2) the Genode component in the user space, these 
components contains the devices drivers, resource 
multiplexer and protocol stacks and (3) at the top is the 
applications layer [22]. Genode is a secure operating system 
architecture, it  maintains tree of processes and ensure that 
process is exposed to only those parts of system on which it 
ultimately depends, if one part of the system is 
compromised, the defect is limited to that particular part and 
its dependent parts, unrelated processes remain unaffected. 
Genode rely on lightweight Internet Protocol (lwIP) [32] 
as TCP/IP stack. It ported lwIP in the form of a library 
running in user space. Basically, lwIP implementation 
focused on reducing the usage of the memory resources and 
the code size to make it suitable for the embedded systems. 
LwIP is a full-scale TCP/IP stack but without any 
implementation for the IPsec protocols.   To gain our goal of 
providing secure communications we used embedded IPsec 
package and integrated it the lwIP stack. The implementation 
of this package is described in the next section.  
IV. IPSEC IMPLEMENTATION  
IPsec may be implemented by several different methods 
in a host. It can be implemented by “bump-in-the-stack” 
(BITS) method which means that IPsec is integrated directly 
below the IP layer. Another method of implementation is by 
integrating IPsec into the IP layer [6].  
In our research, we used an existing package developed 
by Scherer and et al. [7]. They adopted the BITS method for 
their implementation by creating the IPsec as shim and 
inserted it between the IP and link layer as shown in Fig. 1. 
This package has a number of deficiencies; it supports 
the tunnel mode only while the transport mode was not 
implemented. Moreover, it supports only the manual keying 
to set up the Security Association (SA) parameters. Finally, 
it does not handle the problem of IPsec with fragmentation; 
the package can handle the packet with size less than MTU. 
The previous implementation drops the packet silently In 
case the protected packet exceeds the MTU, this action may 
stop the whole communication later.  
We enhanced their package by implementing the 
transport mode for both AH and ESP. We also removed the 
implementation of MD5, SHA1, and 3DES-CBC algorithms 
from the package since they are part of OpenSSL [27] library 
which is ported to the Genode framework. Adding 
fragmentation to the IPsec implementation could be achieved 
in two ways: (a) keep using the BITS architecture and re-
implementing the fragmentation services to keep the IPsec 
package independent or (b) by integrating the IPsec into the 
IP layer and using the existing fragmentation code. We 
selected the second option in our implementation, as shown 
in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 1. Previous IPSec Implementation as layer between the IP and the 
network interface.  
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Fig. 2. Our IPSec Implementation, we integrate the IPsec within the IP 
layer. 
We handled the fragmentation issue for outgoing packets 
as next: 
a. We applied IPsec outgoing packets processing 
for all packets regardless of their sizes without 
checking the need of fragmentation. 
a. We looked up for the SA depending on the 
source and destination addresses in the packet’s 
header. 
b. We processed the packet corresponding to the 
security protocol (AH, ESP, or both) which 
exists in the SA. 
c. In the case of successful processing, we checked 
whether the packet needs to be fragmented to 
pass it to the fragmentation service which passes 
it later to the data link layer.  
d. The packets, which did not need to be 
fragmented, were passed directly to the data link 
layer. 
While for incoming packet we reassembled the fragmented 
packet before applying the IPsec processing on it: 
a. We checked whether the incoming packet needs 
to be re-assembled or not. If the packet was 
fragmented then we passed it to the re-
assembling service. 
b. Then, we looked up for the SA based on the 
Security Index parameter (SPI) in the packet’s 
header. 
c. We processed the reassembled packet regarding 
to the security protocol (AH, ESP, or both) in 
the SA. 
Our primary concern was the evaluation of the overhead 
of IPsec only without considering the overhead of Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE). Therefore, we did not implement the 
IKE in our system. Moreover, the manual keying is 
supported by IPsec implementation in the other system (i.e. 
OpenBSD) of our test bed, so we kept using manual keying 
to configure the cryptographic keys.   
Interoperability is an important key in each software 
implementation. So, we tried to check our IPsec package’s 
interoperability by testing it in non-homogenous 
environment. We were able to successfully establish 
connections to OpenBSD IPsec implementation. 
V. TEST BED CONFIGURATION  
Measurement tools: 
 Many tools have emerged to aid in the performance 
monitoring of the networks. The most common tools to 
measure the latency are ping and Netperf [15]. Since ping 
works in the IP layer, its measurements do not consider the 
above layers. On the other hand Netperf is running in the 
application layer so its measurements will include most of 
the network stack. In addition, Netperf was ported in the 
Genode platform which gives us additional two reasons to 
prefer it: (a) confidence in its integrity with the other 
components of Genode environment and (b) confidence in 
our measurement results by comparing it with others’ 
measurements results.  
Netperf works as client/server application. It consists of 
two applications; the first one is the Netserver, which runs in 
the local host. It waits for the connection from the remote 
host. The remote side runs the second application, which 
called Netperf. Netperf provides us measurements for 
unidirectional throughput and end-to-end latency. 
Experiment environment: 
To conduct our experiment we used Raspberry Pi and 
Asus X53U laptop; Asus laptop was running OpenBSD 5.5 
as OS and had a 1.65 GHz AM-E450 CPU. Raspberry Pi and 
Asus laptop were connected as shown in Fig. 3. 
First, we ran the measurement with unmodified 
implementation of lwIP under Genode OS on the Raspberry 
Pi. Then, we ran the same test with our modified lwIP, which 
contains our embedded IPsec implementation, the test 
environment on the Raspberry Pi is described in Fig. 4. Later 
in the analysis section we compared the results from the two 
measurements. The IPsec configurations for the test bed 
were: 
• IPsec Authentication: we configured the test bed to 
use MD5 as authentication algorithm. 
• IPsec Confidentiality: we set up the test bed to use 
both MD5 as authentication algorithm and 3DES-
CBC as encryption algorithm. 
• IPsec for both AH and ESP was configured to use 
transport mode. 
These configurations were hardwired in the IPsec code in 
the Raspberry Pi side and were configured by changing the 
ipsec.conf file on the OpenBSD side. 
 In our performance test, we considered the next network 





Fig. 3. Layout of experiment environment. 
 
Fig. 4. Raspberry Pi running Genode without IPsec (left) and with modified 
lwIP stack which contains IPsec (right). 
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
A. Latency 
Latency is the time that a single packet takes to travel 
from the source to the destination. We measure the latency in 
two cases; (a) traffic flow from OpenBSD, which runs 
Netserver, to the Raspberry Pi, which runs Netperf, and (b) 
traffic flow from Raspberry Pi, which run Netserver, to 
OpenBSD, which run Netperf.  Fig. 5 represents the relation 
between the latency and different packet sizes for the first 
case. We measured the latency by applying TCP_RR test 
from OpenBSD to Raspberry Pi with various message sizes 
while applying AH, ESP, and no-IPsec. The latency was 
calculated from the transaction rate that was provided from 
Netperf report. Fig. 6 shows the latency when we ran 
TCP_RR test in second case.  
Fig. 5. Latency test for no-IPSec, AH transport, and ESP transport, traffics 
from OpenBSD to Raspberry Pi. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Latency test for no-IPSec, AH transport, and ESP transport, traffics 
from Raspberry Pi to OpenBSD. 
 
Both Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 indicate that latency, in the both 
direction, was increased when we apply ESP; but the 
difference in the latency values is still negligible. At the 
same time they indicate that latency is low when the flow 
runs from Raspberry Pi toward OpenBSD compared to the 
latency when the flow runs in the opposite direction. 
B. Throughput 
Throughput is the amount of data that can be transferred 
from the source to the destination in a specific period of 
time. Fig. 7 represents the result of testing throughput when 
the data flows from the server (Raspberry Pi) to the client 
(OpenBSD) in three different cases: IPsec with AH, IPsec 
with ESP, and no-IPsec.  Different message sizes were used 
to measure the throughput for each test case. 
Fig. 8 shows the throughput when the data flows from the 
client (OpenBSD) to the server (Raspberry Pi) in the same 
three cases. Both the Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 indicate that 
throughput decreases 33% when we use AH compared to its 
value without using IPsec, while it decreases 70% when we 
use ESP compared to the throughput value without using 
IPsec. They also indicate that throughput is better with the 
large message size. The low value of the throughput is not 
caused by our IPsec implementation; when we measure the 
throughput of the system without our IPsec code we got 
close result comparing to our result in the case of using no-
IPsec with our implementation.  To discover the reason of 
low throughput value we checked the packet loos issue, we 
found that the rate of packet retransmission was negligible 
(2%), so it cannot be the main reason of the low 
performance. However, the low throughput was expected 
with the current version of the USB driver and the way of 
processing the high interrupt load on the system. Optimizing 
the process of handling the interrupts issued by the Network 
Interface Card (NIC) will improve the performance of the 
network which consequently will reflect on the IPsec 
performance [28]. 
https://doi.org/10.24355/dbbs.084-201806251525-0
Fig. 7. Throughput test for  NO IPsec, AH transport, and ESP transport. 
traffics from Raspberry Pi to OpenBSD. 
 
Fig. 8. Throughput test for  NO IPsec, AH transport, and ESP transport. 
traffics from OpenBSD to Raspberry Pi. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we evaluated the performance of IPsec 
when it protects the communications of embedded systems. 
The embedded IPsec used as part of the network stack in 
microkernel framework running on the top of cheap and 
known hardware like Raspberry Pi. 
Our experimental result indicated that the throughput 
value decreases when we use AH or ESP comparing to it is 
value in the case when no-IPsec was used. It indicates also 
that when the packet size is small, IPsec becomes less 
efficient. These results are comparable with the results of 
much other research [14] and [30].  Our results also showed 
that the increase of the latency value is small even after 
applying IPsec.   
However, since most of the security issues in the 
distributed embedded system communications  are related to 
the lack of proper authentication mechanism to prevent 
unauthorized parties from hijacking an embedded computer 
or sending false data [26]; we believe that applying AH in 
the communication of constrained resources platforms, such 
as Raspberry Pi running microkernel OS, will solve all the 
issues related to the missing  of data origin authentication 
and the absent of data integrity with acceptable overhead on 
the efficacy.  Achieving privacy by using IPsec with ESP in 
such constrained resource systems will cause significant 
overhead that might degrade the system capabilities in terms 
of throughput.   We also believe that using more efficient 
encryption algorithm such as AES instead of 3DES 
algorithm will improve the performance of ESP [29].   
Since Genode ported the lwIP stack in a way that we can 
use it as a user-level library for Genode applications, the 
lwIP stack will be linked against each networking application 
and they will share one single flow of control, as a future 
work we plan to study the performance of using only one 
lwIP stack with IPsec implementation and make all the 
network applications communicate with it via remote 
procedure calls (RPC). Another effort may be done by 
porting IKE to Genode framework to set up the security 
associations dynamically and then studying the additional 
overhead of using IKE in the same test bed.  
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